Platform Competition as Network Contestability by Gilles, Robert P. & Diamantaras, Dimitrios
Platform Competition as
Network Contestability∗
Robert P. Gilles† Dimitrios Diamantaras‡
October 2013
Abstract
Recent research in industrial organisation has investigated the essential place
that middlemen have in the networks that make up our global economy. In this
paper we attempt to understand how such middlemen compete with each other
through a game theoretic analysis using novel techniques from decision-making
under ambiguity.
We model a purposely abstract and reduced model of one middleman who
provides a two-sided platform, mediating surplus-creating interactions between
two users. The middleman evaluates uncertain outcomes under positional
ambiguity, taking into account the possibility of the emergence of an alternative
middleman offering intermediary services to the two users.
Surprisingly, we find many situations in which the middleman will pur-
posely extract maximal gains from her position. Only if there is relatively low
probability of devastating loss of business under competition, the middleman
will adopt a more competitive attitude and extract less from her position.
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1 Platform provision and contestation
Middlemen arise in many economic and social situations. Usually the emergence
of middlemen in economic situations relates to the nature of supply chains in our
networked, global economy. An individual who occupies a middleman position in
a trade network can interrupt trade as well as information flows and, therefore,
has power due to her position in this trade network. This power implies that a
middleman can command a larger share of the gains from trade under her control.
By withdrawing from a trade chain and disabling the platform she provides, the
middleman can disrupt the interaction between the users under consideration, which
gives the middleman high bargaining power in comparison with these users.
The position a middleman occupies in the network explains her ability to levy
high access and trading fees in the market. This explains the high profits of NYSE
and NASDAQ as well as the success of e-Bay and Amazon.com. It also explains
why Google and Facebook are viewed as potentially extremely profitable; they con-
trol vast amounts of information about individuals who participate in their online
environments.
Recent research in systems science, computer science and physics has investigated
the structure of socio-economic networks that make up the global economy. Evidence
for the importance of middleman positions in these networks has been found and
used to introduce theories that try to understand the functionality of these networks
from this perspective (Newman, Barabasi, and Watts, 2006).1 For example, Vitali,
Glattfelder, and Battiston (2011) and Vitali and Battiston (2013) investigated the
corporate ownership network in the global economy and identified the central position
of middlemen in a so-called strongly connected core. They found that financial
services multinationals occupy positions in this strongly connected core. Clearly,
this refers to the control that these banks as middlemen exert in these ownership
networks.
1.1 Middlemen as platform providers
The main reason that middlemen emerge in the socio-economic networks surrounding
us, is that they facilitate mutually beneficial interactions that make up our global
economy. Although the nature of their privileged positions is well understood, it
is much less clear how middlemen compete or are contested. In this paper, we
propose that a middleman’s perception of potential contestation of his privileged
position filters the way competition limits the power of the middleman. We base our
1We refer to Newman (2010) for an accessible overview of these theories and perspectives.
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argument on the principle that contestability is all in the mind of the middleman
and this may make the middleman slow to react to emerging competition for the
middleman position. We make essential use of tools from the theory of decision
making under ambiguity.
Our point of departure is that middlemen can be fully characterised as providers
of interaction platforms. As such our approach complements the theory of trade
platforms seminally introduced in Rochet and Tirole (2003), developed further for
two-sided platforms in Evans and Schmalensee (2007), Rysman (2009) and Filistruc-
chi, Geradin, and van Damme (2012) and for multi-sided platforms in Hagiu and
Wright (2011) and Evans and Schmalensee (2013). We restrict our discussion to
consider a simplified model of a middleman as a provider of a two-sided interaction
platform and, as such, a middleman is viewed as a facilitator of value-generating
interaction between users of that platform. Our analysis of this intermediated inter-
action situation will be rather different from that employed in the quoted literature
on two-sided platforms.
Two-sided platforms are usually considered to be market organisations that facili-
tate the confrontation of market demand and supply. Platform providers are assumed
to charge usage fees for the market auctioneering services provided. Our approach
fits best with the definition of a platform developed in Hagiu and Wright (2011, page
2), who view a platform as “an organisation that creates value primarily by enabling
direct interactions between two (or more) distinct types of affiliated customers”.
We consider the simple case of a single middleman M , who provides a platform
for the mutually beneficial interaction of two users, denoted as 1 and 2. The network
representation is depicted in Figure 1.
1 M 2
Figure 1: Intermediated interaction between users 1 and 2.
We explicitly assume that the two users cannot interact directly, but only through
the intermediation of the middleman.2 This implies that the middleman has power of
control by virtue of her network position and can exploit that control to her benefit.
Such a middleman can be interpreted as a market-maker, although the platform
does not necessarily have to be a marketplace. For instance, the landlord of a public
house—or “pub”—provides a platform for social interaction, which might or might
not be economic in nature. The pub facilitates the creation of gains from interaction
2An alternative interpretation would be that these users face insurmountable transaction costs
to overcome obstacles to their direct interaction.
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and, therefore, the landlord can expect a share in these gains through the sale of
products in the pub.3
In the abstract social network depicted in Figure 1, we can show in a simple
non-cooperative game that the middleman M normally would exert fully her posi-
tional power and, consequently, would extract the full monopoly profits from the
interaction—such as the only pub in a small town on the King’s Road would do.
The only limitation to this exertion of control is that the two users might have ac-
cess to an alternative interaction platform, provided by another middleman. This
form of contestation represents the most basic form of competition between multiple
middlemen in a network.
One would expect that the access of users to multiple middlemen would be suffi-
cient to guarantee a form of Bertrand-like price competition between intermediating
agents, resulting in a reduction of access fees to marginal cost levels. However, obser-
vations from platform competition in our global economy indicate that there remain
relatively high access fees in place. This was pointed out for payment card services by
Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Rysman (2009). Rysman remarks that access pricing
is affected by how users move between different platforms. In real world platforms,
users move all or some of their usage from one platform to the other. (Rysman, 2009,
page 130)
We develop a simple game theoretic model that uses some of these features. Our
point of departure is that there are essentially two very different viewpoints to mid-
dleman competition with differing implications. First, from a static point of view,
competition could refer to the absence of any middleman power in the interaction
network. This implies that all interaction should either be two-sided—like a match-
ing market—or based on chains with an abundance of multiple platform choices to
all users. Second, from a more dynamic point of view, competition could refer to
the principle that every middleman position should be challenged if it occurs. The
second principle—akin to the classical notion of “contestability” (Baumol, Panzar,
and Willig, 1982)—is much harder to embed in a mathematical theory.
Our aim in this paper is to devise a game theoretic model that can encompass
some basic features of the dynamic approach to platform competition. For this,
imagine that a middleman is able to extract excess rents from the provision of a
platform within the prevailing interaction network. However, if this position can be
challenged, this is sufficient to force the middleman to reduce her transfer fees to a
minimum. Thus, the middleman anticipates the emergence of a competing platform,
3This example of mainly social interaction clarifies that middleman intermediation usually in-
volves investment to provide a platform. See Gilles and Diamantaras (2003) for a formal model of
the costly provision of such market-making in a non-network model.
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which is prevented by the middleman through the reduction of the charged access
fees to her platform. We denote this notion as that the middleman’s position is
contestable in the prevailing network.
For example, Amazon.com is the main book seller on the Internet. So, in principle
Amazon.com can be viewed as a middleman providing a platform in the global book
market. However, Amazon’s position is contestable, since if it charges higher prices,
its potential buyers will resort to purchasing their books at vendors such as local
bookstores or other online book sellers. So, even though many of its clients might be
purchasing books exclusively from Amazon.com, a price increase might allow these
economic agents to change their purchasing decisions and seek trade relations with
alternative sellers even if they have no previous experience with these alternative
sellers. It would also motivate others to start up new online bookstores.
The Amazon.com example refers to a change of behaviour and the activation
of alternative, potential trade relations to circumvent a provided platform in the
prevailing trade network. This behaviour is at the foundation of a dynamic notion of
platform competition. This is depicted in Figure 2: The dashed relationships between
the two users 1 and 2 with the alternative middleman C need to be activated in order
to undermine M ’s middleman position.
1.2 Our modelling approach
We develop a game theoretic approach to the modelling of middleman contestabil-
ity in intermediated interaction situations. as stated, we limit our model to that
of one middleman and two platform users. We describe the gains from interaction
through a hedonic model. The two users are assumed to generate a certain value
from interaction, which can be appropriated by the middleman through the impo-
sition of a access fee to use the interaction platform the middleman provides. We
allow extraction up to all of the gains the interaction generates and assume price
discrimination. As expected, the standard Nash equilibrium in this model without
alternative interaction platforms offered to the users, the middleman will extract all
generated gains. This Nash equilibrium describes the benchmark case in our model
and refers to the monopolistic case with a single middleman or interaction platform.
Next, we introduce a potential alternative middleman into the model, as depicted
in Figure 2. We use the ambiguity approach introduced by Eichberger and Kelsey
(2002) to describe the belief system of a contested middleman. Hence, we assume that
the middleman formulates optimistic and pessimistic beliefs regarding her position in
the interaction network. The optimistic beliefs represent an uncontested middleman
position with full monopolistic extraction depicted in Figure 1, while her pessimistic
5
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Figure 2: Contested interaction between users 1 and 2.
beliefs concern a contested middleman position depicted in Figure 2.
In this model, middleman contestation is introduced as a degree of pessimism—
expression the expectation of the middleman to be in a contested position—as well
as the expected level of interaction under contestation. The latter is understood
as a level of customer loyalty to the platform provided by the middleman. Our
approach founded on this form of ambiguity as a form of boundedly rational decision
making represents the idea that middleman contestability is “all in the mind of the
middleman”.
Our main theorem concludes that if both the degree of pessimism and the ex-
pected level of loyalty under contestation are sufficiently low, the middleman con-
tinues to maximally extract gains from her position. This corresponds to the case
that the middleman takes full advantage of loyal customers, thereby lowering the
quality of the service provided as well as increasing the charged fees. As a real-world
application, we propose that the contemporary pricing policies for banking and mo-
bile telephone services are optimal under boundedly rational behaviour based on
positional ambiguity.
Only when the degree of pessimism and the level of loyalty are sufficiently high,
the middleman will act in a competitive fashion and conform to setting low extraction
rates. Hence, only when platform competition is the norm, competitive behaviour
emerges. This is usually the case in, for example, the retail industry.
We explore these conclusions further in an activity level formulation of our model,
which allows us the make inferences about hybrid cases of a high degree of pessimism
under low levels of loyalty as well as a low degree of pessimism under high levels of
loyalty.
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1.3 Relationship to the literature
In economics, the importance of middlemen in intermediated interaction situations
has already been recognised in Kalai, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1978), investigating
payoffs to middlemen in core allocations in an intermediated trade situation. Rubin-
stein and Wolinsky (1987) subsequently extended this analysis in a model of market
search. Biglaiser (1993) and Biglaiser and Friedman (1994) seminally introduced
middlemen in an industrial organisations approach.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) seminally analysed middlemen within the context of
a network model of economic interaction, which was extended by Gilles, Chakrabarti,
Sarangi, and Badasyan (2006). This literature showed that middleman positions are
critical in networked intermediation and that such middlemen can extract significant
gains from their positions within a cooperative game theoretic framework. Recently
Masters (2007), Masters (2008), Watanabe (2010) and Watanabe (2011) expanded
this approach to develop a network approach to search and matching in markets.
In the literature on two-sided markets, the notion of a platform was seminally
introduced in Rochet and Tirole (2003). The developments in this strand of litera-
ture focussed mainly on the pricing of intermediation services and anti-trust policy
analysis. For a survey for two-sided platforms we refer to Rochet and Tirole (2006),
Evans and Schmalensee (2007), Rysman (2009) and Filistrucchi, Geradin, and van
Damme (2012) and for multi-sided platforms to Hagiu and Wright (2011) and Evans
and Schmalensee (2013).
The platform literature differs in its approach fundamentally from our investiga-
tion in this paper. We are neither concerned with platform pricing nor with anti-trust
implications of platform provision. Instead, we focus on the monopolistic extraction
of rents from the intermediating position of a platform provider, in network termi-
nology known as a “middleman”. In our model, the pricing decision is deliberately
simplistic and the analysis is purely structural: The middleman acts in response to
perceived positional features of the network.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we develop some necessary tools for building a game theoretic model
of middleman contestability for general intermediated interaction.
Strategic form games Let N = {1, . . . , n} be interpreted as a finite set of players
representing rational decision makers. Each player i ∈ N is assigned a strategy set
Si with typical strategy xi ∈ Si. An ordered list (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn ≡ S is
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called a strategy profile, thus introducing S as the set of strategy profiles. Finally,
for each player i ∈ N we introduce a payoff function pii : S → R. A game can now be
represented as a pair (S, pi), where pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) : S → RN is the payoff function.
A strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium of the game (S, pi)
if it holds that for every player i ∈ N and every strategy yi ∈ Si :
pii(x
∗) > pii(x∗1, . . . , x∗i−1, yi, x∗i+1, . . . , x∗n). (1)
Introducing ambiguity into strategic games Considering decision-making processes
subject to ambiguity regarding a player’s game theoretic position, it is natural to
take into account how each of the players perceives the actions of each other. This
refers to the ambiguity in each player’s mind about how other players might come
to decisions. This form of positional ambiguity can be captured by an appropriately
constructed equilibrium notion, an ambiguity equilibrium concept based on so-called
“neo-additive belief systems”.
Based on the seminal contributions in Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Eichberger,
Kelsey, and Schipper (2009) show that under neo-additive beliefs a pure strategy
ambiguity equilibrium in a two-player game corresponds to a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in a transformed game with a three-part payoff function.4 This insight
incorporates the consistency of the mutual (ambiguous) strategic expectations of
both players about each other’s strategy at equilibrium. We use this formulation
here to describe the behaviour of the middleman in the intermediated interaction
situation.
Formally, consider any non-cooperative game (N,S, pi). For player i ∈ N in this
game, ambiguity is represented by the quadruplet (Mi, λi;mi, γi) consisting of the
following elements.
Optimistic beliefs. Each player i formulates well-defined optimistic expectations with
regard to her payoffs in the game. These expectations describe the best that
can occur in the game for this player. In case of positional considerations, this
refers to the case that the player has a “high extraction” position that allows
for maximal extraction of gains from the social interaction situation.
The optimistic payoff function of player i is a function Mi : Si → R assigning
to every strategy xi ∈ Si of player i a high extraction payoff Mi(xi) ∈ R.
The number λi ∈ [0, 1] represents the weight that player i puts on her beliefs
that high extraction will occur. In other words, Λi represents the degree of
4We point out that Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) provide an axiomatic foundation
for the equilibrium concept that underlies the ambiguity equilibrium that was introduced in these
papers.
8
optimism of player i. If λi = 0, player i has no expectation that she will receive
maximal payoffs in the game, while λi = 1 refers to the other extreme case that
player i is fully convinced that she will only receive maximal payoffs.
Pessimistic beliefs. Similarly, each player i formulates pessimistic expectations with
regard to her payoffs in the game in a dual fashion to her optimistic beliefs.
These expectations describe the worst case that this player imagines facing. In
case of positional considerations, this refers to the case that the player has a
“minimal extraction” position that allows for only minimal payoffs from social
interaction.
The pessimistic payoff function of player i is represented by a function mi : Si →
R assigning to every strategy xi ∈ Si of player i her minimally expected payoff
mi(xi) ∈ R.
The number γi ∈ [0, 1] represents the weight that player i puts on her pes-
simistic beliefs, i.e., player i’s degree of pessimism. If γi = 0, player i assigns
no weight to the possibility that she will receive minimal payoffs in the game,
while γi = 1 refers to the other extreme case that player i is fully convinced
that she will only receive minimal payoffs.
Throughout we assume that the belief-system (λi,Mi; γi,mi)i∈N is proper in the sense
that for every player i it holds that λi + γi 6 1, where the sum of the degrees λi + γi
is interpreted as the degree of ambiguity of player i. The remainder 1− λi − γi > 0
represents the player’s degree of belief that she is in a “regular” state in this strategic
interaction situation.
Definition 2.1 A strategy profile x? ∈ S is an ambiguity equilibrium in the game
(S, pi) for the proper belief system (λi,Mi; γi,mi)i∈N if x? is a Nash equilibrium in
the modified game (S, pi), where pii : S → R for each player i is a modified payoff
function given by
pii(xi, x−i) = λiMi(xi) + γimi(xi) + (1− γi − λi)pii(xi, x−i). (2)
If the degree of ambiguity is zero, the modified payoff formulation (2) reduces to the
standard payoff function.
3 A hedonic model of intermediated interaction
In this section we develop a general hedonic model of an intermediated interaction
situation. We assume there are two users and a single middleman who provides a
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platform to facilitate the interaction between these two users as depicted in Figure 1.
Both users select a certain interaction level in the provided platform. The middleman
in turn sets a participation fee for each of these users. This participation fee is set
individually, thereby allowing complete price discrimination.
We first introduce a standard game theoretic model in which in equilibrium the
middleman will extract maximally from her position as a platform provider. Subse-
quently, we introduce ambiguity and derive that a mixed situation emerges with full
monopolistic extraction or fully competitive behaviour under conditions describing
contestation, depicted in Figure 2.
3.1 A benchmark hedonic approach to platform pricing
We consider a three-player non-cooperative game to describe intermediated inter-
action. There are two users, denoted by 1 and 2, who aim to interact to generate
mutual gains. This interaction is intermediated and both users set a participation
level in the interaction platform provided by a single middleman. The generated
gains depend on the selected participation levels. Formally, this is described by the
strategy sets S1 = S2 = [0, 1], with generic strategic variables s1 and s2.
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The middleman M provides an interaction platform on which the two users can
generate mutual gains from interactions. The middleman M sets an access fee for
each user, represented by ρi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2}, i.e., M ’s strategy set is SM = [0, 1]2
with typical element ρ ≡ (ρ1, ρ2).
Regarding the two users, let the function fi : S1 × S2 → R+ describe the gross
benefits generated for user i ∈ {1, 2}, determined by the selected participation levels
(s1, s2) in the provided interaction platform. Hence, fi(s1, s2) > 0 describes the level
of the gains from interaction generated for user i when the users put participation
levels s1 and s2 into the provided interaction platform.
We impose the following condition on the benefit functions f1 and f2.
Axiom 3.1 For each user i ∈ {1, 2}, the benefit function fi is strictly increasing in
each argument.
This monotonicity condition represents that gains from interaction are optimally
generated at maximal exertion of effort or maximal investment. In other words, we
assume that marginal benefits are not exhausted until the assumed maximal level of
participation s1 = s2 = 1 is reached.
5The assumption that the users’ strategies are continuous variables allows us to interpret the
users as standing in for two continua of agents that use the interaction platform.
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Remark 3.2 A special case of our construction is the symmetric situation, where
f1 = f2 = f for some strictly increasing benefit function f : [0, 1]
2 → R+. Clearly,
Axiom 3.1 is satisfied in this case.
A canonical example of such a benefit function f is described by the familiar generic
Cobb-Douglas formulation f(s1, s2) = s
α
1 · sβ2 , where α, β > 0. In particular, the case
of α = β = 1 generates a symmetric, multiplicative model of the interaction between
the two users. We analyse this example later. 
We complete the description of the payoff function of each user by assuming that
the participation fee is simply subtracted from the generated benefits for each user.
Hence, each user i ∈ {1, 2} pays the participation fee ρi > 0 straightforwardly
from the generated benefit described by fi. For every strategy vector (s1, s2, ρ) ∈
S1×S2×SM this introduces the game theoretic payoff function pii : SM×S1×S2 → R+
of user i ∈ {1, 2} as
pii(ρ, s1, s2) =
{
fi(s1, s2)− ρi if ρi 6 fi(s1, s2),
0 otherwise.
(3)
Next we turn to the development of the game theoretic payoff function of the mid-
dleman M . We introduce a function pi : SM × [0, 1]2 → R+ that describes the net
income generated for the middleman M from providing an interaction platform at
certain set participation fees. We hypothesise that this net income is positive and a
function of the participation fees ρ1 and ρ2 as well as the two participation levels s1
and s2.
We make the following regularity assumption.
Axiom 3.3 The net income function pi is weakly increasing in each argument.
Note that the two users 1 and 2 are required both to participate to generate any
income for the middleman. Hence, the participation fees as set by the middleman
M should not exceed the generated benefits for each of the two users. Therefore, the
game-theoretic payoff function for the middleman M is formulated as
piM(ρ, s1, s2) =
{
pi(ρ, s1, s2) if ρ1 6 f1(s1, s2) and ρ2 6 f2(s1, s2),
0 otherwise.
(4)
This completes the setup of the game theoretic framework that describes a hedonic
model of intermediated interaction between two users. Next we turn to the analysis
of this non-cooperative game in strategic form.
Theorem 3.4 The following statements hold for our model.
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(i) Under Axiom 3.1, sˆ1 = sˆ2 = 1 are weakly dominant strategies for users 1
and 2, respectively.
(ii) Under Axioms 3.1 and 3.3, the strategy tuple of maximal usage and full ex-
traction described by sˆ1 = sˆ2 = 1 and (ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = (f1(1, 1), f2(1, 1)) is a Nash
equilibrium in the game describing the hedonic intermediated interaction
situation.
(iii) Under Axioms 3.1 and 3.3, the strategy tuple of maximal usage and full
extraction described by sˆ1 = sˆ2 = 1 and (ρˆ1, ρˆ2) = (f1(1, 1), f2(1, 1)) is
Pareto efficient.
Proof. From Axiom 3.1 it follows immediately that max fi(·, s−i)− ρi is maximised
by si = 1 for both i = 1, 2 regardless of s−i ∈ [0, 1] and ρi > 0. Furthermore, if
ρi > fi(1, s−i), then pii = 0 irrespective of s−i ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, indeed pii is maximal
at si = 1 irrespective of s−i ∈ [0, 1] and ρi > 0. This shows assertion (i).
From (i) it follows that sˆ1 = sˆ2 = 1 are best responses to any ρ = (ρ1, ρ2) > 0.
Given the formulation of piM under Axiom 3.3, it is obvious that ρi = ρˆi = fi(1, 1),
i ∈ {1, 2} is a best response to sˆ1 = sˆ2 = 1, showing assertion (ii).
Obviously, by Axiom 3.3, piM is globally maximal over (s1, s2, ρ) at ρi = ρˆi = fi(1, 1),
i ∈ {1, 2}, if s1 = s2 = 1. The strict monotonicity of fi in both s1 and s2 implies in
turn that pii is maximal over (s1, s2) for the given ρi = ρˆi = fi(1, 1), i ∈ {1, 2}. This
shows assertion (iii).
Theorem 3.4 shows that the maximal usage of the interaction platform described by
sˆ1 = sˆ2 = 1 and its maximal exploitation by the middleman represented by access fees
ρˆi = fi(1, 1), i ∈ {1, 2}, is individually stable as a Nash equilibrium as well as Pareto
efficient under the relatively weak hypotheses stated in Axioms 3.1 and 3.3. This state
of maximal usage and full exploitation represents the benchmark case, in which the
middleman exercises maximal monopolistic control of the intermediated interaction
taking place in the provided platform. As such, it points to the expected outcome
of intermediated interaction described in our model in the absence of meaningful
contestation.
3.2 Introducing contestation as ambiguity
Next we introduce ambiguity into our simple hedonic model of intermediated in-
teraction to express the state of contestation of the middleman’s position in this
interaction. Hence, we endow the middleman with optimistic and pessimistic beliefs
and degrees of optimism and pessimism, according to the neo-additive formulation
of Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2009).
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Thus, the only player considered to be affected by positional ambiguity is the
middleman, who is ambiguous about her position in the intermediated interaction
situation. Her optimistic beliefs refer to a fully successful middleman in complete
control, who is able to extract maximal gains from her position. This state obviously
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium identified in Theorem 3.4(ii).
Her pessimistic beliefs refer to a contested middleman position in which the users
have access to at least one alternative interaction platform. We model this through
the emergence of reduced expected interaction levels in the middleman’s platform and
a lesser ability to extract full participation fees from the provision of that platform.
We introduce these two sets of beliefs as functions M and m in accordance to the
ambiguity model of Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2009) summarised in Section
2.2.
Optimistic beliefs: The middleman believes that the two users fully participate in his
interaction platform at the maximal level sˆ1 = sˆ2 = 1. Hence, the optimistic
outcome for the middleman M equals
M(ρ) =
{
pi(ρ, 1, 1) if ρ1 6 f1(1, 1) and ρ2 6 f2(1, 1),
0 otherwise
Pessimistic beliefs: Under full contestation, the middleman assumes that the two
users only partially participate in the provided platform. This remaining ac-
tivity can be interpreted as a loyalty interaction level, represented by s1 = s
∗
1
and s2 = s
∗
2. The situation that there is no loyalty at all can be described by
s∗1 = s
∗
2 = 0.
These levels express that each user might reduce his participation in the plat-
form and use alternatively provided platforms as well. We assume that the
middleman has an assessment of the contested situation in that she assumes
that usage might be reduced, but not necessarily all the way to zero. Hence,
the parameters s∗1 and s
∗
2 represented such loyalty interaction levels are part of
the description of the (pessimistic) beliefs of the middleman.
Now for the given usage levels, the generated pessimistic payoff function for
the middleman M can be formulated as
m(ρ) =
{
pi(ρ, s∗1, s
∗
2) if ρ1 6 f1(s∗1, s∗2), and ρ2 6 f2(s∗1, s∗2)
0 otherwise.
Given the introduced beliefs and a degree of optimism λ and a degree of pessimism
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γ, we now arrive at the following modified payoff function of the middleman M :
piM(ρ, s1, s2) = λM(ρ) + γm(ρ) + (1− λ− γ)piM(ρ, s1, s2).
Our main result shows that if the middleman is ambiguous, she might maintain
maximal access fees even in the case that she might expect to be contested and that
there is little loyalty among her customers.
Theorem 3.5 Assume that Axioms 3.1 and 3.3 hold, that γ < 1, and that s∗1 < 1 as
well as s∗2 < 1. Then, in the resulting ambiguity equilibrium, the middleman charges
the full exploitation fees of (ρ1, ρ2) = (f1(1, 1), f2(1, 1)) if and only if
∆ > γ
1− γ pi(ϕ, s
∗
1, s
∗
2) (5)
where ϕ = (f1(s
∗
1, s
∗
2), f2(s
∗
1, s
∗
2)) represents the full extraction at the pessimistic, low
usage level of the interaction platform and
∆ = pi(f1(1, 1), f2(1, 1), 1, 1)− pi(ϕ, 1, 1)
is the middleman’s maximal income differential between the maximal usage and low
usage levels.
Proof. Define for ease of notation F = (f1(1, 1), f2(1, 1)) ∈ SM as the maximal fee
vector and ϕ = (f1(s
∗
1, s
∗
2), f2(s
∗
1, s
∗
2)) ∈ SM as the maximal fee vector in case of an
interaction level at the assumed loyalty levels s∗1 and s
∗
2.
First note that, from Axiom 3.1, f1 and f2 are strictly increasing. Hence, by these
hypotheses ϕ F .
Since both users are not subjected to ambiguity, Theorem 3.4(i) holds and, there-
fore, in the resulting ambiguity equilibrium both users will still access the provided
platform maximally at s1 = s2 = 1. We can now compute that the ambiguity payoff
for the middleman selecting the maximal fee ρ = F would result into
piM(F, 1, 1) = λ · pi(F, 1, 1) + γ · 0 + (1− λ− γ)pi(F, 1, 1) =
= (1− γ)pi(F, 1, 1).
Similarly, for the reduced fee ρ = ϕ we compute
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piM(ϕ, 1, 1) = λ · pi(ϕ, 1, 1) + γ · pi(ϕ, s∗1, s∗2) + (1− λ− γ)pi(ϕ, 1, 1) =
= γ · pi(ϕ, s∗1, s∗2) + (1− γ)pi(ϕ, 1, 1).
Hence, piM(F, 1, 1) > piM(ϕ, 1, 1) if and only if
(1− γ)pi(F, 1, 1) > γ · pi(ϕ, s∗1, s∗2) + (1− γ)pi(ϕ, 1, 1)
if and only if
(1− γ) (pi(F, 1, 1)− pi(ϕ, 1, 1) ) > γ · pi(ϕ, s∗1, s∗2).
This is equivalent to
∆ = pi(F, 1, 1)− pi(ϕ, 1, 1) > γ
1− γ pi(ϕ, s
∗
1, s
∗
2).
This completes the proof of the assertion.
4 Application: An activity level formulation
In this section we develop a simplification of the generic model. This application is
founded on the premise that the middleman uses an activity level measure to gage
the success of her business. Furthermore, we assume that in principle the middleman
considers the success of her platform as essential in her performance and, therefore,
in her game theoretic payoff function pi.
Let g : [0, 1]2 → R+ capture the total activity level that the middleman perceives
as being created by the users’ participation in the provided interaction platform.
Hence, g(s1, s2) > 0 measures the activity level perceived by the middleman M if
users 1 and 2 exert participation levels s1 and s2, respectively. The next hypothesis
is equivalent to Axiom 3.3.
Axiom 4.1 The activity measurement function g is weakly increasing in each argu-
ment.
The simplest example of a weakly monotonic activity measurement function is the
constant function given by g(s1, s2) = 1 for all s1, s2 > 0. This particular case refers
to the absence of the measurement by the middleman.
We assume now that the middleman M measures her success by the income
generated as well as the perceived level of activity g(s1, s2) in the provided interaction
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platform. We use a simple multiplicative formulation.
piM(ρ, s1, s2) =
{
(ρ1 + ρ2) · g(s1, s2) if ρ1 6 f1(s1, s2) and ρ2 6 f2(s1, s2),
0 otherwise.
In this formulation it is again taken into account that the platform will only be active
if both users are not overcharged, i.e., if ρi 6 fi(s1, s2) for both i = 1, 2. If at least
one of the users is overcharged, the resulting payoffs are assumed to be nil to the
middleman M .
Furthermore, the middleman’s payoff should be interpreted as a utility function;
the middleman cares about the usage of the provided platform in proportion to the
money the middleman receives, which is ρ. We can interpret this feature of the model
as capturing network effects and the future profitability of the provided platform.6
We emphasise that under contestation there still results a “residual” activity level
g(s∗1, s
∗
2) > 0 based on the loyalty of the middleman’s customers. This residual activ-
ity level represents the minimal activity level that occurs in the provided interaction
platform.
Since Axiom 4.1 and the formulation of piM above implies Axiom 3.3, we can
easily derive the following corollary to Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 4.2 Assume that Axioms 3.1 and 4.1 hold, that γ < 1, and that s∗1 < 1 as
well as s∗2 < 1. Then in the ambiguity equilibrium for the activity level formulation,
the middleman M charges the full exploitation fee ρ = (f1(1, 1), f2(1, 1)) if and only
if (
f1(1, 1) + f2(1, 1)
f1(s∗1, s
∗
2) + f2(s
∗
1, s
∗
2)
− 1
)
g(1, 1)
g(s∗1, s
∗
2)
> γ
1− γ . (6)
Proof. Note that Axiom 4.1 implies that pi(ρ, s1, s2) = (ρ1 + ρ2) · g(s1, s2) satisfies
Axiom 3.3. Therefore, for the activity level formulation Theorem 3.5 applies. Let
fˆ ≡ f1(1, 1) + f2(1, 1) and ϕˆ ≡ f1(s∗1, s∗2) + f2(s∗1, s∗2). Note that (5) translates now to
fˆ · g(1, 1)− ϕˆ · g(1, 1) > γ
1− γ ϕˆ · g(s
∗
1, s
∗
2).
This implies the inequality (6) as asserted in the proposition.
Within the derived formulation in this corollary, the terms on the left measure the
effects of being in a contested state using two ratios in terms of the users’ perceived
usage of the platform and the middleman’s measurement of the same. The ratio on
6In social networks, the usage of the network is a commonly cited statistic to gauge the health
of a network.
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the right refers to the degree of pessimism of the middleman. This has two qualitative
consequences.
First, the higher the perceived drop in usage of the platform due to competition,
the more likely that the inequality holds and, therefore, the middleman will resort
to full exploitation of her position.
Second, the higher the degree of pessimism of the middleman, the less likely
the inequality holds and, therefore, the less likely the middleman will resort to full
exploitation of her position. This indicates that more pessimistic middlemen are
more competitive rather than exploitive.
This dual conclusion is further illustrated for a simplification of the general activ-
ity level formulation to a benchmark case in which the maximal usage of the platform
is normalised to unity and that middleman as well as users measure the usage level
under competition by the same quantifier σ 6 1. The result is a simplified statement
with only two relevant variables, the degree of pessimism γ and the perceived usage
level under competition σ.
Corollary 4.3 Assume that Axioms 3.1 and 4.1 hold. Furthermore, assume that
f1(1, 1) = f2(1, 1) = g(1, 1) = 1 as well as that there is a residual activity level
given by g(s∗1, s
∗
2) = f1(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) = f2(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≡ σ. Then in the resulting ambiguity
equilibrium the middleman charges the full exploitation access fee ρ = (1, 1) if and
only if
(1− γ)(1− σ) > γσ2. (7)
This corollary is illustrated in the graph in Figure 3. The shaded area is exactly the
set of those values of σ and γ in which the middleman will charge the full exploitation
fee of ρ = (1, 1).
This graphical illustration of Corollary 4.3 shows the two qualitative statements
made above. Higher usage losses are represented by lower levels of residual activity
σ and result in full exploitation. Similarly, lower degrees of pessimism γ result in full
exploitation as well.
These two qualitative effects seem at first counterintuitive. The shaded area pre-
dominates, and in this area the middleman acts as though oblivious to contestation.
Consider a low value of residual activity σ—on the vertical axis. The first reaction,
in the standard microeconomic way of thinking, is to say that a low level of residual
activity σ will motivate the middleman to match it; that would be the middleman’s
way of competing with the perceived threat of undercutting that the low σ represents.
We offer the following explanation for this seemingly paradoxical result. The
middleman who faces a low residual activity level σ chooses to ignore the contested
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Figure 3: Depiction of γ (X-axis) and σ (Y-axis) satisfying Corollary 4.3.
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situation this σ represents unless her degree of pessimism γ is sufficiently large. This
behaviour is in fact understandable if we think in terms of the middleman grasping
at straws. “I feel my middleman position is contested, which means my price-setting
power may be weak; well then, I will try to grab as much positional rent as I can
now while I have some monopolistic power.” This explanation is in keeping with
the bounded rationality nature of the middleman’s process of decision-making under
ambiguity. While fleshing out this idea fully requires a dynamic model and indeed
one with at least two distinct middlemen, which we plan to present in a subsequent
paper, we feel that the idea captures powerfully behaviours we see around us.
For example, consider the competitive practices of Microsoft. It continues to rely
for the vast majority of its revenue on its Windows and Office divisions—this has been
notable for some time now—see, for example, The Economist (2006). Meanwhile the
patterns of use of computing devices are moving fast away from the Windows plat-
form running on desktop and laptop computers, towards mobile computing devices
on which Microsoft has so far failed to establish a strong presence, thereby being
unable to act as a middleman (platform provider) to the users and programmers
interested in mobile computing. Microsoft has been acting to protect its privileged
role as a platform provider for some time now, notably resulting in the Antitrust case
brought against it in the US. (See Cass (2013) for a discussion in the general con-
text of antitrust in high-tech.) The recent troubles of Research In Motion (RIM), the
maker of the Blackberry and the associated mobile communication platform, appears
to fit our analysis and can be seen as another example in the field of information
technology.
On the other hand, the retail industry can be represented on the other end of the
two dimensional spectrum considered here. Indeed, retail firms such as supermarket
chains can reasonably be expected to be in the unshaded part of the graph, with
relatively high σ and relatively high γ. The high degree of pessimism γ comes from
the normality of strong price competition in retail, implying that contested positions
are expected as “normal”. Furthermore, the high expected usage level σ comes from
the high degree of trust that well-established chains command with their customers,
who continue to use them in fairly high degree even when alternatives are present.
5 Some concluding remarks
Considering user externalities We can explicitly introduce externalities among the
users of a platform through a simple modification of our model. This refers to
the simple observation that only if both users participate, there actually will be
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any generation of mutual benefits to these users and, by extension, to the platform
provider. In our approach thus far this is excluded through imposition of Axioms
3.1 and 3.3.
A simple alternative formulation to illustrate this point is that of a straightfor-
ward Cobb-Douglas activity level function in the setting of the activity level model
introduced in Section 4. This allows for a fully symmetric formulation of the fact
that benefits are only generated if both users actually participate, i.e., if s1, s2 > 0.
More formally, within the activity level formulation, we assume the canonical
formulation with
f1(s1, s2) = f2(s1, s2) = f(s1, s2) = g(s1, s2) = s1 · s2.
We remark that this case does not satisfy Axiom 3.1, since as is the case with the
Cobb-Douglas function, we have here a minimal level set at the value zero in which
strict monotonicity fails. This describes the inter-personal externalities required for
mutually beneficial interaction between the two users.
The state of maximal usage and exploitation is again given by the Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium with sˆ1 = sˆ2 = ρˆ1 = ρˆ2 = 1, resulting in payoffs pˆi1 = pˆi2 = 0 and
pˆiM = 1.
There is also a class of trivial Nash equilibria in which s1 = s2 = 0 and, given
that f(0, 0) = 0, ρ taking any nonnegative value.7 In each of these equilibria, no
player can improve her payoff by deviating from her equilibrium strategy.
We conclude that the introduction of simple externalities to the interaction be-
tween platform users might generate multiplication of equilibria and, consequently,
potential coordination failure.
A comparison with fully rational behavioural approaches In this paper we have
used quite deliberately an approach founded on the theory of ambiguity in decision
making. Our main hypothesis is throughout that the middleman’s behaviour can
be understood from a purely subjective perspective, informed by the middleman’s
ambiguity about her position in the network.
Our approach contrasts with more traditional models of decision making under
incomplete information in which decision makers are not ambiguous in their assess-
ment of the position of the middleman in the intermediated interaction situation.
Aumann’s model of incomplete information (Aumann, 1976) and Harsanyi’s theory
of Bayesian games (Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a,b) provide alternative approaches founded
7The reason for the existence of these trivial equilibria is that the multiplicative formulation is
not strictly monotone on the boundary—as stated above.
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on a fully rational processing of informational deficiencies rather than the boundedly
rational perspective on ambiguity applied here.
We use a boundedly rational perspective to reflect the principle that competition
is actually a ‘state of mind’. This perspective assumes explicitly that this state of
mind is not fully rational, but instead a reflection of a state of fundamental ambiguity
about the position of the middleman in the intermediated interaction situation. This
also implies that we do not model the potential competitors of that middleman
explicitly, but instead limit ourselves to just modelling the state of mind of the
middleman only.
Our approach yields surprising insights. We find that full extraction occurs
in cases of low ambiguity, reflecting situations in which middleman contestation
is not normal. This refers to situations with significant positional power of plat-
form providers such as occur in markets for networked goods. Instead, competitive
pricing occurs in situations that such contestation is normal, i.e., the degree of ambi-
guity is high. The latter refers to the practices seen in the retail industry and other
competitive market situations.
It is this explanatory power of our approach that justifies it.
Future developments Future research should focus on enhancing our framework to
incorporate more elaborate models with multiple platform providers that operate
under ambiguity about their position in the prevailing interaction networks.
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